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The Charging Decision: At Play m the Prosecutor's 
Nursery 
David Schwendiman* 
The law is written by legislators, interpreted occasionally by appellate 
courts, but applied by countless individuals, each acting largely for 
himself. How it is applied outweighs in importance its enactment or 
its interpretation.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that criminal legislation is so broad indicates that some 
conduct falling within the legislation's literal terms may not necessarily 
lead to criminal prosecution. In reality, there are too few enforcement 
agencies to investigate and prosecute all the crimes reported. This 
means a "first things first" policy needs to be adopted by prosecutors. 
Such a policy would help enforcement agencies focus on areas where 
crime poses the greatest threat. 2 The central question under such a pol-
icy is whether or not to charge someone with a crime. The decision to 
file charges is essentially the product of an ungoverned process;3 yet, 
the entire process, both before and after the decision is made, is affected 
by the prosecutor's discretion to charge. Justice Jackson once observed 
that "the prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation 
than any other person in America."' It is at the charging stage of the 
criminal justice process that this power is most potent. 
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to review the decision to 
prosecute.11 This fact seems to indicate that the decision to charge some-
one with a crime is entitled to great judicial deference. The United 
• Assistant Auorney General, Utah Allorney General's Office. 
1. Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 ]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 
796 (1933). 
2. GERSHMAN, THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, (1986). 
3. See generally Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 945 HARV. L. REv. 
1521 (1981); Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the 
District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568 (1984); Newman v. 
United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967): 
4. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMt:NT 11 (1931). 
5. The exceptions are identified in the portion of the paper devoted to the screening process 
used by the Allorney General's Special Prosecution Unit. 
35 
36 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a reluctance to review the 
decision to charge in Town of Newton v. Rumery. 6 In Rumery, Justice 
Powell, writing for a divided Court observed: 
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to as-
sessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must 
consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government en-
forcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allo-
cate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply can-
not accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. 
Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of 
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "prop-
erly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute."7 
While the case does not directly address the prosecutor's decision 
to charge,8 the opinions by the contending members of the Supreme 
Court, addressing the central issues, illustrate how complex and un-
bounded the prosecutor's discretion in charging can be. 
The decision to charge can be an agonizing mental and emotional 
ordeal for any prosecutor who comprehends the impact of this decision. 
The decision is influenced by a host of subjective and objective factors 
that are unrelated to the judicial strength or weakness of the case. Some 
of these factors include personal sentiment, ethical and moral considera-
tions, practical and political considerations.9 In no other aspect of the 
process is there such room for these contending forces to play them-
selves out and affect the result. Nonetheless, the consistency and fair-
ness of the charging decision contributes greatly to whether the commu-
nity perceives its system of criminal laws as just and fair or arbitrary 
and unpredictable. Moreover, public interest is better served by a flexi-
ble, thoughtful charging decision. It is important to note that the exer-
cise of individual prosecutorial discretion does not mean the prosecutor 
can abandon all mechanical applications of the law. 
The broad discretion vested in the prosecutor, the need for consis-
tency and fairness, and the probability that the decision to charge or not 
to charge will be influenced by uncontrollable forces, suggests that the 
6. 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987). 
7. ld. at 1194. (Citations omitted.) The success of Rumery's lawsuit against the Town of 
Newton, Massachusetts turned on whether a prosecutor could properly exchange a promise to 
drop charges against him for his release of all claims against the authorities who charged him and 
the witness who complained against him. The Court's plurality refused to hold all such agree-
ments per se invalid and specifically found that the release-dismissal arrangement in Rumery's 
case was voluntary, was not the product of prosecutorial misconduct, and would not, if enforced, 
adversely affect the public interest. Rumery's civil rights action was ordered dismissed. 
8. The case deals only with whether a promise not to pursue a civil remedy can be extracted 
form one already accused in exchange for charges being dropped. 
9. Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1545-1573. 
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development of standards for governing the exercise of the prosecutor's 
discretion is necessary in order to insure an evenhanded and fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice.10 Several attempts at creating standards 
have been made. 11 Even though these standards have been criticized for 
being little more than broad guidelines which do nothing to bridle dis-
cretion,12 they are valuable starting points for discussion of the respon-
sible use of the prosecutor's power to charge. Any standard chosen to 
guide the process must be perceived both by the prosecutor and the 
public as reasonable, fair, and just or there will be no commitment to 
its use. A workable standard must take into account the demands and 
concerns of those charged, the demands and concerns of the prosecutor, 
the demands and concerns of society at large, and the demands and 
concerns of the specific community served by the prosecutor. A stan-
dard must guide the use of the prosecutor's power, but be sufficiently 
dynamic to deal with the myriad situations in which it will be applied. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss briefly the foundation of 
prosecutorial discretion in Utah, the components of the charging deci-
sion as it is guided by the standard13 adopted by the Special Prosecu-
tions Unit of the Utah Attorney General's Office, and the various 
checks used to limit prosecutorial discretion generally and specifically 
in the State of Utah. This article is not intended to be a comprehensive 
examination of the area of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of 
discretion. 14 
10. Orrutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954); see also, Young v. United States 107 
S.Ct. 2124 (1987). 
II. Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1560-1573; see also Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law En-
forcement, 27 U. CHIC. L. REv. 427 (1960); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of An 
Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145 (1973). 
12. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL jUSTICE, Prosecution Function,~~ 3-2.9(b), 3-3.1, 3-
3.4, 3-3.5, 3-3.6, 3-3.8, and 3-3.9 (Discretion in the charging decision); MoDEL CoDE OF PRo-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-13, EC 7-14, EC 7-21, EC 9-6, DR 7-102(A)(I), DR 7-
103(A), DR 7-105(A) (1979); Principles of Federal Prosecution, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' 
MANUAL,§ 9-27.000 (June 15, 1985). 
13. The standard is essentially the set of guidelines proposed in the ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JusTICE, The Prosecution Function, for governing the charging decision. 
14. Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1545: 
Self-imposed limits on discretion may have greater force than either their detractors or 
creators realize. As they acquire greater visibility, they may become part of the popular 
climate and professional culture in which prosecutors work. In the end, however, such 
limits are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who 
abide by them to limit their own discretion. Human nature being what it is, people 
rarely give up power voluntarily, and thus the capacity of self-regulation to remove 
prosecutorial abuse and arbitrariness from the criminal justice system is limited. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
UTAH: UsE oF THE MonEL APPROACH 
Prior to 1980, criminal prosecutions initiated by the Utah Attor-
ney General were not common. The authority of the Attorney General 
in Utah to bring criminal prosecutions is contemplated by statute: "It is 
the duty of the attorney general . . . to . . . prosecute . . . all causes 
to which the state ... is a party."15 This duty has been acknowledged 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 16 Moreover, the Attorney General has the 
power in Utah to supersede a local prosecutor and initiate criminal 
prosecutions if he believes it to be necessary .17 If a district judge makes 
a finding that a county attorney is unable to adequately perform his 
duties in prosecuting a criminal case without additional legal assistance, 
the Attorney General has been given the authority to provide that 
assistance. 18 
The Special Prosecutions Unit [Unit] of the Utah Attorney Gen-
eral's Litigation Division was formed for the express purpose of inves-
tigating and prosecuting crimes that have statewide significance or im-
pact, and for dealing with criminal cases where local prosecutors are 
unable or unwilling to prosecute. Like other prosecutors in Utah's sys-
tem of criminal justice, the Assistant Attorneys General assigned to the 
Unit have wide latitude in determining how, when, and whether to 
prosecute violations of Utah law. To guide the Unit in its exercise of 
the charging power, the general statements of policy set out in the ABA 
Standards of Criminal Justice have been adopted to summarize the ap-
propriate considerations to be weighed and the desirable practices to be 
followed in exercising the charging function. 19 
III. THE ABA STANDARD 
ABA Standard 3-3.9 summarizes the policy followed by the Unit 
in making the decision to charge or not to charge someone with a 
crime.20 The standard is used in the evaluation of evidence in every 
case. Standard 3-3.9 has proven to be a reasonable, workable tool for 
analyzing facts and making defensible charging decisions. 
15. See also UTAH CoDE ANN. § 67-5-1(1) (1953). 
16. State v. Jiminez, 588 P.2d 707 (Utah 1978); Meyers v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex 
rei. Weber County, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (Utah 1945). 
17. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(5) (1953), see also National Association of Attorneys-
General-Committee on the Office of the Attorney-General, THF: PRoSF:CUTION FUNCTION: Lo-
CAL PROSECUTORS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 24-28 (1974); Note, The Common Law Power 
of the State Attorneys-General to Supersede Local Prosecutors, 60 YALE L.J. 559 (1951). 
18. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 17-18-1(14) (1953). 
19. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, ch. 3 (1980). 
20. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL jUSTICE 3.55 (1980). 
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The pertinent component of Standard 3-3.9 is the consideration of 
factors arguing against prosecution of the crime, even though existing 
evidence suggests a likelihood of conviction21 should the case be prose-
cuted. The evidence to be considered is: 
(a) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact 
guilty;22 
(b) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;23 
(c) the consideration that the punishment for the crime committed 
is more severe than the offense or the offender warrant;24 
(d) the possible improper motives of the complainant;211 
(e) the reluctance of the victim to testify;26 
(f) how cooperative the accused was in assisting law enforcement 
in the apprehension or conviction of others;27 and, 
(g) the availability and likelihood of prosecution in another 
jurisdiction. 28 
Standard 3-3.9 also suggests that prosecutors not "bring or seek 
charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported 
with evidence at tria1."29 In other words, the prosecutor must not over-
charge his case for any purpose.30 Personal or political advantage must 
not affect the decision. 31 
Before the components of Standard 3-3.9 can be considered, four 
inquiries must be made. These are: ( 1) should full investigation be 
made;32 (2) has a crime been committed;33 (3) who is the offender or 
offenders;34 and, ( 4) is there sufficient admissible evidence available to 
support a verdict of guilty. 311 
A. Additional Factors Affecting The Charging Process 
In addition to what the standard suggests, in practice, the Unit 
21. Standard 3-3.9(a). 
22. Standard 3-3.9(b) (i). 
23. Standard 3-3.9(b) (ii). 
24. Standard 3-3.9(b) (iii). 
25. Standard 3-3.9(b) (iv). 
26. Standard 3-3.9(b) (v). 
27. Standard 3-3.9(b) (vi). 
28. Standard 3-3.9(b) (vii). 
29. See the commentary to Standard 3-3.9. 
30. Standard 3-3.9(e). 
31. Standard 3-3. 9(c). 
32. See Appendix A. 
33. /d. See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, supra note 20, at 3.55. 
34. See Appendix A. Compare MoDEL Com: oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-
1 03(a) (1980). 
35. /d. 
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takes several other factors into consideration before charging. The Unit 
targets its investigation to problems specifically concerning the state,36 
and tries to limit its caseload to those matters that have wider applica-
tion and significance than cases handled on the local level. As a result, 
public scrutiny of the cases brought by the Unit is generally more rig-
orous than would be expected in most criminal cases. Consequently, the 
Unit measures its cases, when appropriate, against various judicial 
characterizations of prosecutorial misconduct37 before deciding to 
charge. 38 
1. Misconduct 
A prosecutor should prosecute earnestly and vigorously. While he 
"may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."39 Pros-
ecutors have the duty to use every legitimate means available to bring 
about a just conviction, and must refrain from any improper methods 
which would produce a wrongful conviction.40 
The central judicial characteristic reviewed by the Unit is selective 
prosecution-arbitrarily selecting and prosecuting a defendant from a 
group of similarly situated defendants.41 
A defendant's defense against selective prosecution raises three im-
portant questions for a prosecutor. First, have other persons similarly 
situated to the defendant not been prosecuted ?42 Second, was the de-
fendant consciously and deliberately singled out?43 Third, was the basis 
for choosing the defendant arbitrary, invidious or some how im-
proper?44 Such a review of the judicial characteristic of selective 
36. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1526-30. 
37. See Baker, supra note I for a comprehensive treatment of the subject of prosecutorial 
misconduct and abuse of prosecutorial authority and discretion. 
38. Securities fraud, white collar crime, especially advance fee schemes, and prison corrup-
tion are areas the Unit has targeted for special attention in the last several years. Small staff and 
limited resources have combined to make it very difficult for the Attorney General to target effec-
tively without the cooperation of other state agencies and the United States Attorneys Office. That 
cooperation has led to some of the more notable successes enjoyed by the Unit in the last few 
years. 
39. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (I 935). 
40. Id. 
41. The leading case dealing with selective prosecution is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, JIB U.S. 356 
(I 886). 
42. GERSHMAN, supra note 2, at § 4.3 (b). 
43. Id. at § 4.3(c). 
44. Id. at § 4.3(d). The defense of selective prosecution has not received any attention from 
the Utah Supreme Court. Neither has the doctrine of vindictive prosecution nor demagogic prose-
cution. Professor Gershman discusses in detail these issues in §§ 4.3-4.5 of PROSECUTORIAI. Mis-
CONDUCT supra note 2. 
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prosecutorial misconduct keeps prosecutors within the legitimate means 
of getting a just conviction. 
B. Applying The Standard 
The Unit's approach is similar to that taken by the Justice De-
partment''11 in deciding whether to initiate or decline prosecution. This 
approach goes further than the Code of Professional Responsibility; it 
requires more than a simple determination that probably cause exists in 
a case.46 The prosecutor is required to engage in a serious analysis of 
the facts, to determine how evidence can or will be used at trial, to 
analyze the offender, and to evaluate the community the prosecutor 
serves. Prosecutors are forced to do more than just screen cases. The 
standard does not allow placing the burden on the magistrate, the 
grand jury, or the trier of fact to sort out whether a crime has been 
committed!7 
In many cases handled by the Unit, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral assigned to a matter will be involved with the Investigations staff 
from the very beginning of an investigation. This is always true when a 
practice or conduct is targeted for enforcement purposes. The informa-
tion collected as part of the investigation is periodically reviewed by the 
attorney and the agents working on the case. The charging standard is 
used as a test against which the material generated by the investigation 
is measured and as a tool for guiding further inquiry. 
1. Criminal information, statements of probable cause, indictments 
In order to determine whether a crime has been committed, 
whether there is sufficient evidence for a conviction,whether a full in-
vestigation is needed, and who to charge, the Unit encourages the prep-
aration of annotated criminal information, statements of probably 
cause, and indictments. Evidence and information is indexed and cata-
loged as it is gathered so that as an investigation or inquiry develops 
the Unit can account immediately for what has come into its possession. 
Handling evidence in this manner makes it possible, anytime before the 
charging decision is made, to retrieve any item, document, statement or 
other material for the purpose of matching the facts of the case with the 
elements of the offenses under investigation. This allows the agents and 
the attorneys to determine where the investigation can best be directed. 
45. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12. 
46. MoDEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103(a). 
47. For a general overview, see Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: 
Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 
568 (1984). 
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It also indicates whether additional resources should be devoted to the 
investigation, whether the matter ought to be closed, and whether the 
case is ready for the charging decision to be made. Annotated criminal 
information, probable cause statements, and indictments are the vehicle 
for matching elements and facts. 
Handling evidence in this manner assures that the Unit will not 
charge unless the State's case is ready to try. Handling evidence in this 
fashion makes discovery more complete, fair and efficient once charges 
have been filed. The attorney handling a case is generally able to hand 
defense counsel a copy of the index to the evidence at the time the 
defendant makes his first appearance. The index is updated as addi-
tional material is collected or comes into the possession of the 
government. 
Working drafts of information and probable cause statements or 
indictments are often discussed while an investigation or inquiry is in 
progress. Decisions are sometimes made at this stage not to pursue a 
matter further if efforts to match elements with facts demonstrate that 
one of the above inquiries is not likely to be satisfied by continued ef-
fort. In that way valuable resources are saved for more deserving en-
forcement efforts. 
Once it becomes apparent that facts exist to make out the elements 
of an offense and that the above inquiries can be satisfied, an annotated 
information statement and a probable cause statement or indictment is 
circulated among the members of the Unit. The case is then examined 
in light of the remaining components of the standard.48 The attorney or 
attorneys assigned to the case take the lead are ultimately responsible 
for making the charging decision; but, the decision will be informed by 
comment and discussion generated both formally in staff meetings and 
informally during conversations between the members of the Unit. The 
collective experience of those who form the Unit is in this way brought 
to bear on every charging decision made by the Unit. The process 
forces the assigned attorney to know the facts and law and enables him 
to defend his decision to charge before any charges are ever filed. 
2. Notice 
In almost every case, after the decision to charge a defendant with 
a crime has been made, the defendant and counsel for the defendant are 
given notice of the decision before charges are filed. The defendant is 
told what the anticipated charges will be and is given an explanation of 
the evidence that supports the charges. He is invited to explain his ver-
48. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text. 
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sion of the events underlying the charges and to suggest alternative in-
terpretations of the evidence and alternative dispositions. In some cases 
defendants have made a case based on "not charging" or for handling 
the matter in ways other than by involving the criminal justice system. 
In many cases the prosecuting attorney will not explain any evi-
dence differing from that reflected in the draft charges and statement of 
probable cause. No notice is given when such notice of the decision, 
details of the charges, or statements in support of the charges would put 
any person at risk, cause economic harm, compromise ongoing investi-
gations, or make it less likely that the case can be successfully prose-
cuted once charged. 
IV. CHECKS IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE THE CHARGING PROCESS 
In addition to the self-imposed limitations on the charging decision 
reflected by the adoption of the ABA standard, there are a number of 
checks that keep the prosecutor's power to charge within bounds. 
A. Personal Checks 
The single most important variable in the charging process is the 
individual making the decision. How that person is selected and 
trained, how much experience he can bring to the making of the deci-
sion, and what resources are available to him as he contemplates the 
decision are critical factors. These factors combine to determine the 
quality of any charging decision, and underlie whatever perception the 
public has of the criminal justice system as a whole. How the system is 
viewed in terms of its consistency and predictability is the product of 
how these factors develop over time. 
1. Public influence 
Creating and supporting career opportunities for public prosecu-
tors is vital to developing a reserve of experience necessary to ensure 
that charging decisions are made responsibly. The public must be com-
mitted to keeping in service those prosecutors who have proven them-
selves capable of making responsible charging decisions. Providing 
training and continuing education for career prosecutors, even to the 
point of requiring them to certify or recertify on a regular basis, must 
be a feature of any responsible system of public prosecution. This will 
contribute measurably to the quality and consistency of the charging 
decisions made by those within the system. Keeping experienced people 
in the system is one means of ensuring that adequate resources will be 
\ 
44 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
available for others to draw upon when making charging decisions. Ed-
ucation and training keeps those resources current and effective. 
2. Experience and training 
There will be no improvement in the way in which prosecutorial 
discretion to charge or plea bargain is exercised without improvement 
in the quality, experience and training of those entrusted with the 
power to exercise that discretion. There can be no effective check 
against the use of that authority unless there is some assurance that 
experienced, well trained, well supported people are the ones using it. 
Personal checks, however, are not the only means for limiting the use of 
prosecutorial discretion. Judicial checks are also used. 
B. judicial Checks 
Normally, every charging decision made in Utah must survive the 
scrutiny of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing.49 If the magistrate 
finds probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been commit-
ted by the defendant, the defendant is bound over for trial in the district 
court. 5° 
1. The preliminary hearing 
The preliminary hearing offers some protection against the prosecutor 
who fails to adequately satisfy the four inquiries suggested by this pa-
per; but, it cannot, of course, take into account any of the considerations 
which might argue against charging or which might militate in favor of 
an alternative disposition. While the rule allows the defendant at a pre-
liminary hearing to testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evi-
dence,51 these things are rarely done in practice. Moreover, the defend-
ant's interests are rarely well served by a presentation of any evidence 
in his favor because the purpose of the preliminary hearing is so nar-
row-to determine whether probable cause exists to justify requiring 
the accused to stand trial. The decision whether to prosecute is not ex-
ercised by the Unit alone. Another check on the prosecutor's power to 
charge is the grand jury. 
49_ UTAH CoNsT. ART. I, § 13; UTAH CoDE ANN. § 77-35-7(d) (1953). 
50. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 77-35-7(d)(1) (1953). 
51. UTAH ConE ANN.§ 77-35-7(d)(l) (1953). 
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2. The grand jury 
Utah law provides for charging a crime by means of an indictment 
voted by a grand jury.52 Grand juries, however, are rarely used in Utah 
practice, and when used have seldom if ever successfully protected any-
one from the expense and embarrassment caused by an improper 
charging decision. Traditionally, special counsel has been appointed to 
assist grand juries.53 The selection of special counsel has often failed to 
take into account the need to appoint public prosecutors with current 
experience in advising the grand jury about its authority to charge 
crimes. As a result, the quality and consistency of the advice given to 
grand juries concerning the decision whether, what, and whom to 
charge has not been good. Because grand juries are so rarely used and 
because special counsel is not generally a career prosecutor, the possi-
bility exists that those advising the grand jury will attempt to offset the 
enormous expense associated with a grand jury by ensuring the return 
of some indictments. This suggests that some irresponsible charging de-
cisions will inevitably be made. 
The secrecy which attends a grand jury in Utah54 compounds the 
problem by making it generally impossible for special counsel to confer 
with others and draw upon their experience when evaluating facts in 
anticipation of recommending criminal charges. In short, the Utah 
grand jury offers no protection against inadequate, uninformed, or abu-
sive exercise of the discretion to charge someone with a crime. 
Besides personal checks and judicial checks, two other means for 
limiting prosecutorial discretion can be found in Utah's Constitution 
and statutes. 
C. Constitutional and Statutory Checks 
1. Constitutional checks 
Utah's Constitution contains a curious check against a prosecutor's 
refusal or failure to prosecute. Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution provides in part: "If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to 
prosecute, the supreme court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor 
pro tempore."55 The power to secure the appointment of special coun-
52. UTAH CoNsT. ART. I, § 13; UTAH Com: ANN. § 77-35-5 (1953). 
53. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 77-11-9 (1953). 
54. UTAH Com: ANN. § 77-11-10 (1953). See Young v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2124 
(1987). 
55. Compare United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 935 
(1965); Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefel-
ler, 477 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784-88 (1977); and 
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920). 
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sel to the Salt Lake County grand jury has been invoked only once.56 
The appointment of a prosecutor pro tempore was predicated not on 
any failure to prosecute, but, on the Attorney General's giving into the 
wishes of special counsel and representing to the court that he refused 
to prosecute any indictment that might be returned. In hindsight, the 
appointment was unnecessary and shortsighted. 
2. Statutory checks 
There are several statutory provlSlons in Utah's criminal code 
which limit the prosecutor's authority to charge. Section 7 6-1-104, for 
example, requires that the criminal code be construed to: (2) Define 
adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense 
and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as crim-
inal. . . . . ( 4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons 
accused or convicted of offenses. 57 Section 7 6-1-404 bars the prosecu-
tion of a person who has previously been charged by the United States 
or by another state with the commission of an offense if the charge 
resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution and 
the charge contemplated in Utah would be the same offense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The charging decision is an aspect of the criminal justice system 
that is virtually unreviewable. The prosecutorial discretion in choosing 
what, whom, and whether to charge someone with a crime invests the 
prosecutor with greater power than any other individuals associated 
with law enforcement. 
Some limits on the exercise of that authority are desirable, but 
they must not be so restrictive that they ignore the dynamic nature of 
the prosecutor's role in society. The standard suggested by this paper is 
a workable, reasonable attempt to bring some relief to the dilemma of 
deciding whom to prosecute and what to charge. 
The best way of ensuring that responsible charging decisions will 
be made in any system of criminal justice is to adopt a workable stan-
dard outlining the issues and concerns involved in the decision to prose-
cute. Another way of ensuring responsible charging is to incorporate 
checks limiting prosecutorial discretion into the standards for charging. 
Finally, the Attorney General's Office should concentrate on selecting, 
training, and educating prosecutors; to convince those capable of mak-
56. The power was called into existence in January, 1986, as prosecutors pro tempore for the 
purpose of allowing them to prosecute the indictments returned by that grand jury. 
57. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-1-104 (1953). 
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ing good, responsible, defensible charging decisions to make careers of 
public prosecution. 
APPENDIX A 
Standard 3-3.9. Discretion in the charging decision 
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or 
cause to be instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal 
charges when it is known that the charges are not supported by proba-
bly cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of 
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction. 
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the 
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and 
for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, 
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support 
a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may prop-
erly consider in exercising his or her discretion are:(i) the prosecutor's 
reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (ii) the extent of the 
harm caused by the offense; (iii) the disproportion of the authorized 
punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender; (iv) 
possible improper motives of a complainant; (v) reluctance of the victim 
to testify; (vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or convic-
tion of others; and (vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by 
another jurisdiction. 
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give 
no weight to the personal and political advantages or disadvantages 
which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record of 
convictions. 
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the 
prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in 
the jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit persons accused of the par-
ticular kind of criminal act in question. 
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in 
number of degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at 
trial. 
